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INTRODUCTION 
In the years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and 
Hurricane Katrina’s destruction along the Gulf Coast in 2005, the United 
States has continued to modernize how it responds to disasters and 
emergencies.1 One of the most important facets of any response to a 
disaster is protecting and preserving the health of the victims and the 
general public. To that end, the federal and state governments have 
developed a patchwork scheme of laws intended to grant various levels of 
authority and civil immunity to government actors and volunteer 
responders as a means of making emergency resource acquisition and 
distribution more efficient. These laws are also meant to encourage 
volunteers to provide their skills to those in need within the  
disaster-affected state.2 
                                                     
* I would like to extend my gratitude to William Dow, Amy Magnano, and the editing staff of the 
Seattle University Law Review for their invaluable assistance in the development of this article. 
 1.  INST. OF MED., GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE FOR USE IN 
DISASTER SITUATIONS: A LETTER REPORT 10 (Bruce M. Altevogt et al. eds., 2009). 
 2. See Lainie Rutkow, Jon S. Vernick, Maxim Gakh, Jennifer Siegel, Carol B. Thompson & 
Daniel J. Barnett, The Public Health Workforce and Willingness to Respond to Emergencies: A  
50-State Analysis of Potentially Influential Laws, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 64, 65 (2014) (enumerating 
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As the large-scale response to the disaster begins to mount, front line 
hospitals and medical practitioners may receive material and personnel 
support from the federal government or other states. As additional medical 
practitioners from beyond the disaster-affected state respond, these 
practitioners are given immunity from civil liability under a mixture of 
federal and state laws developed to encourage and assist volunteers who 
provide medical assistance.3 Conversely, local first-responding private 
physicians face the greatest risk of liability for the care they provide under 
such trying conditions. Unlike their out-of-state counterparts, private 
physicians practicing in the disaster-affected state are often not granted 
immunity from civil liability.4 
Practicing medicine during a disaster can leave a local practitioner 
vulnerable to many potential causes of action, such as the following: 
(1) negligence, by the practitioner or the hospital under a theory of 
corporate negligence or respondeat superior; (2) constitutional 
claims, for lack of due process or equal protection; (3) criminal 
liability, for inadequate treatment or providing treatment beyond the 
scope of their usual practice; (4) Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) violations, for privacy breaches or  
sub-standard recordkeeping; (5) Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) violations, for alleged discrimination in the triage criteria 
used for the providing of care; (6) Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Labor Act (EMTALA) violations, for failing to comply with the 
Act’s requirement to provide a medical screening and render the 
patient medically stable upon arrival to the hospital.5 
While practitioners might successfully defend themselves from 
liability, litigation is a less-than-optimal outcome. Defending against a 
claim places many burdens on a practitioner, including (1) taking time 
away from the practitioner’s ability to see patients;6 (2) taking an 
                                                     
influential state laws on this topic); Christina Y. Chan, Support for the First Line of Defense in Public 
Health Emergencies, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1347, 1352–63 (2011) (discussing federal laws protecting 
public and private health care entities and practitioners). 
 3. See Rutkow et al., supra note 2, at 65. 
 4. See Sharona Hoffman, Richard A. Goodman & Daniel D. Stier, Law, Liability, and Public 
Health Emergencies, 3 DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 117, 122 (2009) [hereinafter 
Hoffman et al., Law, Liability, and Pub. Health] (discussing where patients will go after injury in a 
disaster and the general disparity in public actor versus private actor liability immunity); Sharona 
Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 1913, 1953–56 (2008) [hereinafter Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility] (discussing in detail the 
ways in which private actors are denied liability immunity). 
 5. Hoffman et al., Law, Liability, and Pub. Health, supra note 4, at 120. 
 6. Jonathan Thomas, The Effect of Medical Malpractice, 19 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 306, 310 
(2010). 
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emotional and psychological toll on the practitioner;7 (3) negatively 
impacting his or her professional reputation by calling into question the 
practitioner’s competency as a medical professional;8 (4) increasing his or 
her medical malpractice insurance premiums;9 and (5) potentially 
imperiling the practitioner’s license to practice medicine in the state (or 
states) in which he or she possesses a medical license.10 These burdens 
may generate a chilling effect that will dissuade private practitioners from 
providing medical care because disaster conditions negatively impact their 
ability to care for patients. Granting civil liability immunity to private 
practitioners during times of disaster will allow those private practitioners 
to avoid having to defend against a claim altogether, thus negating the 
chilling effect and will allow doctors to care for their patients to the full 
extent of their abilities, no matter how severely disaster conditions may 
impact the care being provided. 
This Note identifies how the Pacific Northwest Emergency 
Management Arrangement member states of Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and 
Washington11 apply tort liability and immunity to medical professionals 
during times of disaster. This Note also identifies an example statutory 
scheme that, if enacted, will provide equal protection to all physicians who 
provide care to disaster victims, regardless of their local or out-of-state 
status. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Practice of Medicine 
When a disaster strikes, local hospitals and their associated 
physicians are often the first to respond, as these practitioners treat disaster 
victims who make their way to nearby hospitals.12 These hospitals may 
receive a volume of patients that exceeds a hospital’s “surge capacity.” 
                                                     
 7. See S. Sandy Sanbar & Marvin H. Firestone, Medical Malpractice Stress Syndrome, in THE 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SURVIVAL HANDBOOK 9, 9–15 (2007). 
 8. Thomas, supra note 6, at 310. 
 9. Morgan Lewis Jr., Medical Malpractice Costs Continue to Climb, MED. ECON. (Jan. 11, 2012), 
http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/news/clinical/practice-
management/medical-malpractice-costs-continue-climb [https://perma.cc/TA6G-G7K6]. 
 10. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 18.130.180 (2015). 
 11. While the Canadian province of British Columbia and the Yukon Territory are also 
Arrangement members, they will be excluded from the scope of this note because of the systemic 
differences in health care delivery and management of medical liability in the United States and 
Canada. 
 12. See Hoffman et al., Law, Liability, and Pub. Health, supra note 4, at 122 (discussing where 
patients will go after injury in a disaster). 
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Surge capacity is the maximum limit of a hospital’s available resources to 
treat patients.13 
As resources become depleted, medical practitioners are forced to 
make difficult strategic and ethical choices regarding how to allocate the 
care and resources available. This decision-making process is known as 
triage. Various methods of triage exist, the most common of which is 
practiced in emergency rooms across the United States every day. The 
guiding principle of day-to-day triage in an emergency room is to rank 
incoming patients by the severity of their injuries, expediting the treatment 
of the most gravely injured patients, while having patients with less critical 
complaints wait.14 
Alternatively, the guiding principle of disaster triage, which is 
applied when a hospital meets or exceeds its surge capacity, is to adjust 
the ranking criteria to place the focus on public care and saving the greatest 
number of people possible.15 This new focus on saving the many at the 
cost of the few gravely injured, coupled with the strain on personnel and 
material resources, can give rise to questions regarding the applicable 
standards of care and the potential causes of action that may be brought 
against the hospital or medical practitioner responding to disasters. 
The practice of medicine has two different and distinct standards of 
care that medical practitioners must abide by to avoid incurring liability: a 
medical standard of care and a legal standard of care.16 The medical 
standard of care is “the type and level of medical care required by 
professional norms, professional requirements, and institutional 
objectives.”17 This medical standard of care is often institution-based and 
dependent on the circumstances under which the care was rendered.18 The 
legal standard of care is “the care and skill that a healthcare practitioner 
must exercise in particular circumstances based on what a reasonable and 
prudent practitioner would do in similar circumstances.”19Although the 
legal standard of care is defined on a state-by-state basis, the various 
definitions align with the general principle above because of medical 
malpractice’s long common law history.20 
                                                     
 13. See Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility, supra note 4, at 1918. 
 14. Dawn Cushman, When Disaster Hits, Where Does the Standard of Care Go?, 31 J. 
HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT. 6, 11 (2011) (discussing the underlying goals of triage patient 
management). 
 15. Id. 
 16. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 45 (distinguishing the medical and legal standards of care in 
the medical profession). 
 17. Id. at 45 (defining the medical standard of care). 
 18. Id. (discussing the underlying factors considered in the medical standard of care). 
 19. Id. (defining the legal standard of care). 
20. See Peter Moffett & Gregory Moore, The Standard of Care: Legal History and Definitions: 
The Bad and Good News, 12 W.J. EMERGENCY MED. 109 (2011). 
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B. Declarations of Emergency, Disaster, or Public Health Emergency 
An invaluable tool for addressing any disaster is a “declaration of 
emergency” (a.k.a. an “emergency declaration”). An emergency 
declaration is often the event that triggers the granting of emergency 
powers to a governmental executive officer, agency, committee, or person 
or group tasked with managing the response to a disaster. The practice of 
granting extraordinary powers and immunity from liability extending from 
the use of those powers, has existed alongside the idea of democratic 
governance since the Roman era.21 
The decision to make an emergency declaration balances the factors 
that support the existing legal authority structure (e.g., limits on executive 
authority, governmental borrowing and purchasing limitations, medical 
device testing standards, etc.) with the ability to effectively and efficiently 
respond to the conditions that created, or are the result of, the disaster.22 
When the existing bureaucratic processes impede the ability of the 
government to respond to a disaster, the executive officers of federal, state, 
and local governments may respond by declaring a state of emergency—
if their respective legislative branches have granted them the authority to 
do so. 
Granting extraordinary powers to the government and its agents 
during times of crisis also serves to create a divide between public medical 
practitioners and private medical practitioners. When a declaration of 
emergency, disaster, or public health emergency is made, medical 
practitioners who are a part of the governmental response to the disaster 
or emergency, or who are acting in a volunteer capacity, are given special 
immunities.23 These immunities are granted in an effort to encourage 
volunteerism, but private practitioners—those who are “on call” or on-the-
job and being paid during the disaster—are not given any special 
immunity.24 
Because this Note looks specifically at the medical aspect of a 
disaster, the focus will be on declarations identifying the existence of a 
public health emergency. A public health emergency is a condition where 
                                                     
 21. Under normal circumstances, the executive branch of the Roman Republic consisted of two 
elected Consuls, who shared the duties of the executive branch. During exceptional  
circumstances—almost exclusively war—the Roman Senate passed legislation requesting the Consuls 
elect a Dictator. It was understood that “circumstances might arise in which it was of importance for 
the safety of the state that the government should be vested in the hands of a single person, who should 
possess for a season absolute power, and from whose decisions there should be no appeal to any other 
body.” WILLIAM SMITH, A DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES, 404–08 (John Murray 
ed., 1875). 
 22. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 46. 
 23. See infra Part I.C. 
 24. Ryan Bailey, The Case of Dr. Anna Pou: Physician Liability in Emergency Situations, 12 
AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 726, 729 (2010). 
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“a health situation’s ‘scale, timing or unpredictability threatens to 
overwhelm routine capabilities.’”25 Declarations of emergency can be 
made at the federal, state, and local levels of government. 
At the federal level, several acts of Congress have granted the 
President the power to declare a general state of emergency. The two main 
acts are the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act (Stafford Act) and the National Emergencies Act.26 Under the Stafford 
Act, the President has the authority to declare a state of emergency and 
render aid to a state if the Governor of that state indicates that local and 
state resources have been overwhelmed and are in need of federal 
assistance.27 Under the National Emergencies Act, there is no specific 
definition of what constitutes a disaster or emergency, thus providing the 
President much broader discretion to declare an emergency and utilize the 
powers granted by Congress.28 
After the President has declared a general state of emergency, the 
Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) is also authorized to declare a public health emergency “in case of 
a disease, disorder, or bioterrorist attack that justifies such a declaration”29 
pursuant to the Public Health Service Act.30 When the Secretary makes a 
determination that a public health emergency exists, the Secretary may, at 
that time or retroactively, grant waivers exempting hospitals and health 
care practitioners from regulatory requirements imposed upon them by 
Medicare, Medicaid, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor 
Act (EMTALA),31 and the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA).32 
At present, the only state in the Pacific Northwest Emergency 
Management Agreement that has granted its governor the authority to 
declare a public health emergency is Oregon.33 The Oregon statute defines 
a public health emergency as existing when there is an act of biological 
terror, a new or previously eradicated source of infection that has the 
potential to be highly contagious, an epidemic, a natural disaster, a 
                                                     
 25. Rebecca Mansbach, Altered Standards of Care: Needed Reform for When the Next Disaster 
Strikes, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 209, 209 (2011). 
 26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5206 (2011); 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (2011). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 5191(a) (2011). 
 28. See 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (2011). 
 29. See Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility, supra note 4, at 1922. 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2014). 
 31. EMTALA is a federal law that requires a hospital’s emergency room to stabilize and treat 
any patient who arrives there, regardless of his or her insurance status or ability to pay. See EMTALA, 
AM. C. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, https://www.acep.org/News-Media-top-banner/EMTALA/ 
[https://perma.cc/26X5-7KK7]. 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b–5 (2010). 
 33. OR. REV. STAT. § 433.441(1) (2014). 
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chemical spill, a chemical attack, a nuclear accident, or a nuclear attack, 
and such event poses a high probability of (1) a large number of deaths in 
the affected population; (2) the creation of a large number of serious or 
long-term disabilities in the affected population; or (3) widespread 
exposure to an infectious or toxic substance that may cause significant 
harm in the future.34 
C. Tort Immunity Statutes 
The legislative purpose of statutes granting tort immunity is to 
encourage medical practitioners to provide medical care to those in a 
disaster area by lessening the medical practitioners’ concerns about 
possible claims made against them resulting from the care they provide in 
the disaster area.35 The medical practitioners who receive immunity under 
these laws are shielded from any liability, so long as the act was not 
criminal, willful misconduct, or grossly negligent.36 These statutes have 
been enacted both federally and by the states.37 
In this Note, the medical practitioners that are protected under these 
statutes will be classified into three categories: government actors, 
volunteer actors, and private actors. Government actors are individuals, 
agencies, or organizations acting to render aid within their capacity as a 
governmental entity, as an agent or employee of a governmental entity, or 
under the authority or direction of a governmental entity. The most 
common source of tort liability immunity for government actors is 
statutory sovereign immunity. Volunteer actors are individuals or 
organizations that are acting to render aid while receiving, or expecting to 
receive, little or no compensation. Alternatively, private actors are 
individuals or organizations acting to render aid while receiving, or 
expecting to receive, compensation. 
1. Federal Statutes 
Several federal statutes granting tort liability immunity during public 
health emergencies exist. These statutes cover government, volunteer, and 
private actors. 
                                                     
 34. OR. REV. STAT. § 433.442 (2014). 
 35. Judith C. Ahronheim, Service by Health Care Providers in a Public Health Emergency: The 
Physician’s Duty and the Law, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 195, 199 (2009). 
 36. Chan, supra note 2, at 1361. 
 37. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-11 (2013); 42 U.S.C. §247d(a) (2006); 42 U.S.C.  
§§ 14501–14505 (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090 (2015); IDAHO CODE §§ 5-330, 46-1017,  
39-1391c, 39-7703 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.800, 30.805, 676.340, 676.345 (2015); WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 4.24.300, 38.56.080 (2015); Chan, supra note 2. 
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a) Federal Statutes Granting Government Actor Immunity 
Medical practitioners who provide medical services as government 
actors receive statutory immunity derived from governmental sovereign 
immunity by means of precluding suits for their actions as government 
actors, agents, or deputies under the Federal Tort Claims Act.38 There are 
three statutes that clearly illustrate the practice of a statute deputizing a 
medical practitioner as an agent of the government to qualify for 
government actor immunity. 
The first statute created was the National Disaster Medical System 
(NDMS).39 The NDMS consists of rapidly deployable groups of volunteer 
medical practitioners, with each group specializing in specific kinds of 
disaster response.40 HHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
the Department of Defense, and the Department of Veterans Affairs jointly 
administer the NDMS program.41 The authority to activate and deploy the 
NDMS groups is granted to the Secretary of HHS by the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002.42 
The second of these statutes is the Public Readiness and Emergency 
Preparedness (PREP) Act.43 The PREP Act focuses on the tools and 
materials, such as “drugs, devices, and biological products”44 categorized 
as “covered countermeasures,”45 that a medical practitioner may require to 
provide treatment during a public health emergency and the liability that 
may result from the use of those covered countermeasures.46 Under the 
PREP Act, the Secretary of HHS has the authority to make a determination 
that “a disease[,] . . . health condition[,] or other threat to health constitutes 
a public health emergency, or that there is a credible risk that the disease, 
condition, or threat may in the future constitute such an emergency.”47 The 
Secretary also has the authority to specify “the manufacture, testing, 
                                                     
 38. See Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility, supra note 4, at 1938. 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-11 (2013). 
 40. Chan, supra note 2, at 1354. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-11 (2013)). 
 43. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247-6d to 247d-6e 
(Supp. 2007). 
 44. Hoffman et al., Law, Liability, and Pub. Health, supra note 4, at 121. 
 45. A “covered countermeasure” is a broad statutory definition that encompasses any drug, 
biological product, or device that is authorized by the Secretary of HHS for use in responding to an 
emergency. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(1)(c) (2006). When the covered countermeasure is used to 
combat the natural spread of disease, it is referred to as a “qualified pandemic or epidemic product.” 
See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(7)(c) (2006). When the covered countermeasure is used to combat “any 
biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent” it is referred to as a “security countermeasure.” 
See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b(c)(1)(B). 
 46. Targeted Liability Protections for Pandemic and Epidemic Products and Security 
Countermeasures, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2005). 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b)(1) (2006). 
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development, distribution, administration, or use of one or more covered 
countermeasures.”48 Under the PREP Act, “a covered person49 shall be 
immune from suit and liability under Federal and State law with respect to 
all [tort] claims for loss . . . resulting from the administration to or the use 
by an individual of a covered countermeasure . . . .”50 Immunity is only 
waived for a “death or serious physical injury” resulting from “willful 
misconduct.”51 An entity or person is engaging in willful misconduct when 
they knowingly and intentionally, with no legal or factual justification, act 
or fail to act with the purpose of accomplishing a wrongful goal, 
disregarding known or obvious risks that are so great that it is highly 
probable the potential harm will outweigh the potential benefit.52 
The third statute is the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).53 Under 
normal circumstances, a government agency and its agents may be subject 
to a civil suit for damages when their actions cause injury, or otherwise 
incur liability under the FTCA.54 However, during a state of emergency, 
the agency and its actors may not be subject to a claim under the FTCA’s 
discretionary function exemption.55 This exemption bars claims against 
actions of a federal employee for decisions made based on consideration 
of public policy that involved the exercise of the employee’s discretion or 
judgment, unless the decision intrudes upon the constitutional rights of an 
individual.56 The United States is also immune from claims brought under 
the FTCA if the injury underlying the claim was caused by exercise of 
governmental discretion, “whether or not that discretion is exercised 
negligently or wrongfully, whether or not it is exercised at all, and whether 
or not it is abused.”57 
This discretionary exemption grants broad immunity to 
governmental agencies and their “on-the-job” employees during a state of 
emergency to enable them to make the best possible judgment calls on 
matters of public policy. Hypothetically, this government immunity could 
apply to medical practitioners employed by or acting under the direction 
of a government agency. In short, when a state of emergency exists, the 
                                                     
 48. Id. 
 49. A “covered person” is the United States, or a person or entity who is: the manufacturer; 
distributor; program planner; the qualified individual prescribing, administering, or dispensing the 
covered countermeasure; and any of the agents, employees, or officials of the persons or entities 
described above. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(2) (2006). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1) (2006). 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d)(1) (2006). 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(c)(1)(A) (2016). 
 53. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2014). 
 54. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–72 (2006). 
 55. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2014). 
 56. AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PROOF OF FACTS 241 (3d ed. 2009). 
 57. Lane v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 864, 867 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
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controlling emergency statutes under which governmental agencies act 
and governmental agents exercise their powers provide those government 
actors with immunity under the FTCA through the discretionary function 
exemption. 
b) Federal Statutes Granting Volunteer Actor Immunity 
Another route that medical practitioners may take to secure tort 
immunity while practicing medicine during a disaster is to practice 
medicine as a volunteer. Rather than becoming a de facto or de jure 
government employee and securing government actor immunity, it may be 
more practical for most medical practitioners to provide volunteer medical 
services to receive federal statutory immunity. The Volunteer Protection 
Act of 1997 (VPA) grants properly licensed volunteers rendering aid on 
behalf of government entities and nonprofit organizations limited 
immunity for harm that results from any act or omission performed within 
the scope of their responsibilities, provided that act or omission does not 
amount to “willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless 
misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of 
the individual harmed.”58 The VPA also establishes a minimum level of 
protection for volunteer aid workers, including volunteer medical 
practitioners, by preempting any state law that fails to offer equal 
protections, but not those laws that offer greater protections.59 
A limiting factor of this immunity is that medical practitioners will 
only receive volunteer immunity if they are providing services for less than 
$500 per year or on an uncompensated volunteer basis.60 This 
compensation limitation prevents paid medical practitioners from utilizing 
volunteer immunity during disasters. The purpose of this type of 
legislation is to counter the deterrent effect potential volunteers might feel 
as a result of possible liability against them.61 
c) Federal Statutes Granting Private Actor Immunity 
Medical practitioners who provide medical services as private actors 
and charge for their services are often left ducking for cover when seeking 
liability protections under federal statutes designed to protect medical 
practitioners and other emergency personnel responding to disasters.62 The 
                                                     
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a) (2014). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 14502 (2014). 
 60. The Volunteer Protection Act defines a “volunteer” as “an individual performing services 
for a nonprofit organization or a governmental entity who does not receive . . . compensation (other 
than reasonable reimbursement or allowance for expenses actually incurred)[] or any other thing of 
value in lieu of compensation, in excess of $500 per year . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501–05 (1997). 
 61. Ahronheim, supra note 35, at 199 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1) (2006)). 
 62. Hoffman et al., Law, Liability, and Pub. Health, supra note 4, at 122. 
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greatest likelihood of a private physician receiving immunity under federal 
public health emergency laws is through the PREP Act; however, this 
immunity is limited to harms related to the use of a covered 
countermeasure approved under the Act.63 Hypothetically, a paid medical 
practitioner could use a covered countermeasure in the course of treating 
a patient;64 however, if the use of the covered countermeasure were to 
cause harm to the patient, the limitation on liability would only extend to 
the use of the controlled countermeasure.65 
2. Interstate Mutual Aid Agreements 
A mutual aid agreement is a cooperative agreement entered into by 
states, territories, provinces, tribes, and other governmental entities for the 
purpose of sharing strategic resources such as personnel, volunteers, and 
information when responding to a public health emergency.66 This type of 
cooperative response to emergencies originated as a solution to the 
ineffective utilization of volunteer medical practitioners during the 
Hurricane Katrina disaster, where questions regarding licensing impeded 
volunteers.67 There is one national-scale interstate mutual aid agreement 
that includes all fifty states, known as the Interstate Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC),68 and several smaller 
regional-scale agreements, which may include multiple states and some 
governmental entities from neighboring Canadian and Mexican territories 
and provinces.69 
a) Interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) 
Originally approved by Congress in 1996 with thirteen member 
states,70 the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a 
national-scale mutual aid agreement administered by the National 
Emergency Management Association. To request aid under EMAC, the 
                                                     
 63. Chan, supra note 2, at 1361; Hoffman et al., Law, Liability, and Pub. Health, supra note 4, 
at 122. 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d)(1). 
 65. Id.; Chan, supra note 2, at 1361. 
 66. DANIEL D. STIER & MELISA L. THOMBLEY, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
PUBLIC HEALTH MUTUAL AID AGREEMENTS: A MENU OF SUGGESTED PROVISIONS 1 (2007), 
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 67. Ahronheim, supra note 35, at 202. 
 68. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 (1996). 
 69. See generally An Updated Overview of the Great Lakes Border Health Initiative, MICH. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.michigan.gov/mdch/0,4612,7-132-54783_54875-
170665—,00.html [https://perma.cc/3JFE-MSB3]; OR. PUB. HEALTH DIV., UPDATE REPORT ON 
PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN OREGON 11 (2008), https://public.health. 
oregon.gov/Preparedness/mediacenter/Documents/phep0708.pdf [https://perma.cc/329H-2TTR]. 
 70. Emergency Management Assistance Compact §1. 
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governor of a state must declare a state of emergency, assess the needs of 
the state, determine the amount by which the state’s local resources will 
fall short, and place a request with the National Emergency Management 
Association.71 Under EMAC, when a licensed medical practitioner is sent 
to a state requesting aid, the requesting state must recognize the medical 
practitioner as licensed to practice medicine.72 However, EMAC’s liability 
protection only extends to “[o]fficers and employees of a party state 
rendering aid” by treating them as if they were agents of the requesting 
state for purposes of liability and immunity.73 This immunity extends to 
any good faith act or omission occurring during the rendering of aid, so 
long as the act or omission does not amount to “willful misconduct, gross 
negligence, or recklessness.”74 
Unfortunately, EMAC fails to provide immunity from liability to 
volunteers.75 Some states address this shortcoming directly with 
legislation extending the immunity to responders who are not state 
employees.76 However, EMAC does not expressly define what an 
“officer,” “employee,” or “agent” is.77 This ambiguity thus allows the 
possibility of arguing that individuals deputized by the state, or otherwise 
acting under the orders of the state or a state employee, can be considered 
an “officer,” “employee,” or “agent” of the state and, therefore, qualify for 
immunity under EMAC.78 
b) Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement (PNEMA) 
The Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement 
(PNEMA)79 is an intergovernmental regional mutual aid agreement 
between the states of Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington, as well as 
the Canadian provinces of British Columbia and the Yukon Territory.80 
The agreement allows any member to request aid from other member 
states in the event of a “natural or technological emergency or disaster” or 
                                                     
 71. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 (1996); 
see Emergency Management Assistance Compact, NAT’L EMERGENCY MGMT. ASS’N, 
http://www.emacweb.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=99&Itemid=339 
[https://perma.cc/53YB-R6RU]. 
 72. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, art. V. 
 73. Id. at art. VI. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at art. VI (restricting immunity from liability to “officers and employees of a party state”). 
 76. See IND. CODE § 10-14-3-19(d) (2013); IOWA CODE § 135.143.2 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 
37-B, § 784-A (2013); Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility, supra note 4, at 1942. 
 77. See generally, Emergency Management Assistance Compact, §1. 
 78. See Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility, supra note 4, at 1942. 
 79. Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement, Pub. L. No. 105-381, 112 Stat. 
3402 (1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 402.250 (2015). 
 80. Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement, Pub. L. No. 105-381, 112 Stat. 
3402 (1998). 
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“enemy attack.”81 For a member state to request aid, the authorized 
representative may make a request to the authorized representative of any 
other member state, either verbally82 or in writing, with a description of 
the emergency service required, the amount and type of assistance 
required, and a time, place, and point of contact for responding forces.83 
The licensed medical practitioner receives the same licensing 
recognition under the PNEMA as they would under the EMAC. However, 
unlike EMAC, PNEMA offers liability protection to any person or entity 
of a member state by treating them as if they were agents of the requesting 
state for purposes of liability and immunity.84 Under PNEMA, all 
government actors and volunteers are extended liability immunity for their 
acts or omissions in rendering aid, or while maintaining or operating any 
equipment associated with rendering aid, unless that act, omission, 
maintenance, or operation amounts to “willful misconduct, gross 
negligence, or recklessness.”85 
3. State Statutes 
States have also enacted statutes to address the issue of responder 
liability during disasters.86 States have implemented a variety of 
approaches to deal with the issue of responder liability, and the approach 
implemented can vary drastically from state to state. This note will focus 
on the four states that are members of the Pacific Northwest Emergency 
Management Arrangement.87 This section explores the various approaches 
adopted by the four states and highlight the lack of immunity available to 
paid medical practitioners during disasters. 
a) Alaska 
i. Alaska State Statutes Granting Government Actor Immunity 
According to the Alaska Code, a deputized medical practitioner or 
one made an agent of the State to provide medical services on behalf of 
the State can receive government actor immunity in the same manner that 
a deputized medical practitioner or one made an agent of the federal 
                                                     
 81. Id. 
 82. A verbal request for aid must be accompanied by a written confirmation within fifteen days 
of the initial request. Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement, Annex B, art. III(2) 
(2005). 
 83. Id. art. III(2)(A)–(C). 
 84. Id. art. VI. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See infra Part I.C.3(a)–(d) 
 87. Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement, Pub. L. No. 105-381, 112 Stat. 
3402 (1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 402.250 (2015). 
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government can receive government actor immunity.88 During a state of 
emergency, “the state, a district of the state, an employee, agent, or 
representative of the state or a district, or a volunteer or auxiliary civilian 
defense worker or member of an agency”89 an “officer or employee of 
another state,”90 or “a volunteer authorized by the state, a municipality or 
other political subdivision of the state, or a federal agency to engage in a 
civil defense activity”91 is not liable for damage to property or injury or 
death to a person if the harm occurred while in the process of preforming 
a civil defense activity92 or obeying a civil defense order or 
regulation.93Additionally, out-of-state volunteers rendering aid under the 
EMAC and PNEMA mutual aid agreements are afforded the same liability 
as a condition of Alaska’s membership in those agreements.94 
ii. Alaska State Statutes Granting Volunteer Actor Immunity 
Under Alaska’s version of a Good Samaritan law, an individual who 
encounters an “injured, ill, or emotionally distraught person”95 who 
“reasonably appears . . . to be in immediate need of emergency aid in order 
to avoid serious harm or death . . .”96 at a “hospital or any other location”97 
and “renders emergency care . . . or counseling . . . is not liable for civil 
damages [from] an act or omission in rendering emergency aid.”98 
Additionally, 
[a] member of an organization that exists for the purpose of providing 
emergency services is not liable for civil damages for injury to a 
person that results from an act or omission in providing first aid, 
search, rescue, or other emergency services to the person, regardless 
of whether the member is under a preexisting duty to render 
assistance, if the member provided the service while acting as a 
volunteer member of the organization.99 
Under this statute, a volunteer is defined as an individual who is paid 
less than $10 per day for a total of less than $500 a year, exempting any 
                                                     
 88. See supra Part I.C.1(a). 
 89. ALASKA STAT. § 26.20.140(d)(1) (2015). 
 90. Id. § 26.20.140(d)(5). 
 91. Id. § 26.20.140(d)(6). 
 92. In Alaska, civil defense activities include medical service, vaccination, and other actions to 
protect public health. Id. § 26.20.200(2). 
 93. Id. § 26.20.140(b). 
 94. See Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 
(1996); Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement, Annex B, art. VI (2005). 
 95. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090(a) (2015). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. § 09.65.090(b). 
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costs incurred while providing the emergency service.100 However, this 
immunity will not apply if (1) the person rendering care is a physician who 
has a preexisting duty to render emergency care,101 or (2) the actions or 
omissions that occurred while rendering aid amount to gross negligence, 
recklessness, or intentional misconduct.102 
iii. Alaska Statutes Granting Private Actor Immunity 
Under Alaska’s Good Samaritan statute, as originally passed by the 
legislature, a private medical practitioner working in a hospital would have 
qualified for immunity.103 However, the Supreme Court of Alaska held 
that physicians and other individuals who had taken on a preexisting duty 
to render care were ineligible to receive liability immunity under the Good 
Samaritan statute.104 
In Deal v. Kearney, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the 
legislative purpose of including physicians under the Good Samaritan 
statute was to encourage physicians to render emergency medical services 
to people who were not their patients and not to exempt physicians from 
any preexisting duties owed to patients the physician had before the 
emergency started.105 Under Alaska’s statutes, private medical 
practitioners who are being paid for their work lack immunity for 
emergency services rendered during a condition of disaster emergency.106 
b) Idaho 
i. Idaho Statutes Granting Volunteer Actor Immunity 
Idaho has two statutes granting immunity to volunteer actors: a Good 
Samaritan statute107 and a statute granting immunity to health care 
professionals providing charity care.108 Under Idaho’s Good Samaritan 
statute, any person or group offering or rendering first aid or medical care 
                                                     
 100. See id. 
 101. Deal v. Kearney, 851 P.2d 1353 (Alaska 1993) (holding that physicians do not receive 
immunity from the Good Samaritan statute if they have a preexisting duty to render emergency care); 
see also Bunting v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 971 (D. Alaska 1987) (holding Alaska’s “Good 
Samaritan” statute provides partial immunity only to persons who had no preexisting duty to render 
aid). 
 102. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090(d) (2015). 
 103. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090 (2016). 
 104. See Kearney, 851 P.2d at 1353 (holding that physicians do not receive immunity from the 
Good Samaritan statute if they have a preexisting duty to render emergency care). 
 105. Kearney, 851 P.2d at 1356–57. 
 106. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090(b) (2016). 
 107. IDAHO CODE § 5-330 (2015). 
 108. Id. § 39-7703. 
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in good faith by stopping at an accident is given immunity.109 The 
immunity will exist until the person receiving aid is delivered to a hospital, 
placed in the care of an ambulance attendant, or delivered to the office of 
any person who treats ill or injured persons.110 This immunity prevents any 
civil claim for damages.111 However, the immunity will not apply if it can 
be proven that the volunteer actor rendering care provided care or 
otherwise treated the person in a grossly negligent manner.112 
The strict conditions imposed in Idaho’s Good Samaritan statute 
significantly limit the immunity it could provide to medical professionals 
responding to a disaster. The statute limits the scope of immunity in two 
ways. First, the statute restricts immunity physically by requiring the 
rendering of aid be initiated at an accident site.113 Second, the statute 
terminates the immunity when the aid recipient is delivered to a hospital, 
clinic, or other emergent care facility.114 This restriction, while protecting 
medical first responders, does not cover the medical professionals who are 
receiving the patient at a hospital, clinic, or office. The second Idaho 
statute providing protection to volunteer actors offers immunity for any 
civil action as a result of the actor providing charity care if the patient has 
signed a waiver explaining that the care is to be rendered with no 
expectation of payment and that the medical practitioner will be granted 
immunity.115 
The preauthorization requirement makes this statute unsuitable for 
offering immunity to medical practitioners under most disaster response 
conditions. Several factors may impede the ability of medical practitioners 
providing charity care during a disaster to secure a signed waiver of 
payment from a patient: (1) the physical location and condition of the site 
where the medical practitioner is rendering care may be unsuitable for the 
creation, retrieval, or filing of waivers (e.g., imminent danger necessitating 
rapid treatment and evacuation, loss of power, flooding, rendering care in 
a field hospital, destruction of hardcopy files, destruction of computers or 
loss of computer networks, lack of administrative personnel, etc.); (2) the 
response to a mass casualty event may be too frantic and chaotic to 
successfully locate and duplicate forms; (3) medical practitioners may 
prioritize triaging patients and providing emergency medical care over 
securing waivers. 
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ii. Idaho Statutes Granting Private Actor Immunity 
In an effort to encourage doctors of any specialty or training to 
provide emergency care, Idaho presumes that any licensed physician116 is 
“qualified to undertake . . . any emergency or surgical care.”117 This 
presumption requires that the treatment provided by the medical 
practitioner is the result of a good faith judgment that the care is required 
based on the condition and best interest of the patient, and that the care is 
rendered in a manner that is not grossly negligent under the 
circumstances.118 Under the statute, any physician or hospital that 
performs emergency care will be granted immunity from any civil action 
resulting from that care.119 
Eby By & Through Eby v. Newcombe is the controlling case law for 
this statute.120 In Eby, the Supreme Court of Idaho found that, while this 
statute was intended to encourage a physician of any specialty to render 
emergency care or first aid, it was not intended “to affect or change the 
standard of care or liability of physicians in the ordinary doctor/patient 
relationship.”121 The Supreme Court of Idaho opined that when an 
ordinary doctor–patient relationship exists, the attending medical 
practitioner does not qualify for immunity under the statute when 
rendering emergency care.122 
c) Oregon 
i. Oregon State Statutes Granting Government Actor Immunity 
When either a state of emergency or a public health emergency is 
declared, medical practitioners who are registered on the “emergency 
healthcare provider registry,”123 or those who volunteer to render medical 
services, are considered agents of the state for tort liability and immunity 
purposes.124 Additionally, those locations designated as “emergency 
health centers” by the Oregon Health Authority and “persons operating 
emergency health care centers designated [by the Health Authority] are 
agents of the state . . . for the purposes of any claims arising out of services 
that are provided . . . without regard to whether the . . . person is 
                                                     
 116. Id. § 39-1391(c) (2015). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Id. § 39-1391(c) (2016). 
 120. Eby By & Through Eby v. Newcombe, 780 P.2d 589 (1989). 
 121. Id. at 591. 
 122. See id. at 592. 
 123. Id. § 401.654 (2015). 
 124. Id. § 401.667 (2016). 
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compensated for the services.”125 However, this immunity will only extend 
to those emergency health centers that have “credentialing plans that 
govern the use of emergency health care providers registered under [the 
emergency health care provider registry] and other health care providers 
who volunteer to perform health care services.”126 
ii. Oregon State Statutes Granting Volunteer Actor Immunity 
Oregon’s Good Samaritan statute is unique among the PNEMA 
states, as it restricts the class of people covered to professional medical 
practitioners.127 However, the statute maintains the usual requirements that 
the care be voluntarily rendered without expectation of compensation and 
to a person who, based on the circumstances, is in need of emergency 
medical or dental care as the final means to prevent death or serious 
harm.128 Further, it grants immunity from any action for damages that 
result from an act or omission while rendering aid, so long as the aid 
rendered was not grossly negligent.129 However, Oregon’s statute imposes 
location-specific conditions on the availability of statutory immunity. 
Specifically, the statute only provides immunity for “[m]edical or dental 
care not provided in a place where [such care] is regularly available, 
including . . . a hospital . . . first aid station [or] office of a physician, 
physician assistant, or dentist.”130 
iii. Oregon State Statutes Granting Private Actor Immunity 
The State of Oregon currently lacks a statutory scheme to grant 
immunity to medical practitioners who are paid during a state of 
emergency. 
d) Washington 
i. Washington State Statutes Granting Government Actor Immunity 
During a state of emergency, no “covered volunteer emergency 
worker” can be held liable for any act or omission committed while 
performing “covered activities”131 rendered during the course of 
responding to the disaster,132 unless those acts or omissions amount to 
                                                     
 125. See id. § 401.667(2) (2015). 
 126. See OR. REV. STAT. § 401.667(4) (2015). 
 127. See id. § 30.800; see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090(a) (2015), IDAHO CODE § 5-330 
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 128. See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.800 (2015). 
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“gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.”133 A “[c]overed 
volunteer emergency worker” is an emergency worker who is not 
receiving, nor expecting to receive, compensation from the state as an 
emergency worker and who is not a state or local employee, unless that 
employee is on unpaid leave at the time.134 Under the statute, an 
emergency worker is a “person who is registered with a local emergency 
management organization . . . and holds an identification card issued by 
the local emergency management director . . . or is an employee of the 
state of Washington or any political subdivision thereof who is called upon 
to perform emergency management activities.”135 The covered activities 
that invoke liability protections are as follow: 
Providing assistance . . . authorized by the department during an 
emergency or disaster or search and rescue . . . whether such 
assistance . . . is provided at the scene of the emergency or disaster or 
search and rescue, at an alternative care site, at a hospital, or while in 
route to or from such sites or between sites . . . .136 
ii. Washington State Statutes Granting Volunteer Actor Immunity 
Washington’s Good Samaritan statute covers any person who 
provides “emergency care at the scene of an emergency [or] 
transportat[ion from the scene] for emergency medical treatment ” without 
an expectation of compensation.137 The Washington Good Samaritan 
statute will provide that person with immunity from any action for civil 
damages caused by an act or omission in rendering the emergency care if 
the manner in which the emergency care was provided does not amount to 
“gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.”138 The controlling 
case law relating to the Good Samaritan statute is Maynard v. Ferno-
Washington, Inc.139 In Maynard, the court found that the purpose of the 
Good Samaritan statute is to “protect volunteer emergency workers 
coming to the aid of an injured person from liability for simple negligence 
that caused further injury to the injured person.”140 
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iii. Washington State Statutes Granting Private Actor Immunity 
The State of Washington currently lacks a statutory scheme to grant 
immunity to medical practitioners who are paid during a state of 
emergency. 
II. ISSUES WITH THE CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEMES 
As they stand, the laws offering immunity to medical practitioners 
during times of declared emergencies or disasters fail to provide legal 
protection to the front line practitioners who are often the first to reach 
surge capacity, as victims of a disaster seek care and are admitted to private 
hospital facilities.141 Further, these laws are fractured and difficult to 
navigate, lack standardization, and fail to provide uniform protections to 
all disaster responders.142 In every PNEMA member state, the doctors 
staffing emergency rooms and trauma centers do not currently enjoy the 
same liability protections that are extended to federal or state government 
actors or Good Samaritan volunteers.143 
Hypothetically, the current legal landscape could allow for two 
surgeons of equal skill and care, operating on the same patient, under the 
same conditions, and with the same resources, to have the same civil action 
brought against them and yet experience different degrees of liability. The 
first surgeon could be held liable if he or she was either on call or working 
at the time of the disaster. However, the second surgeon could be held not 
liable due to the immunity that the surgeon receives under government 
actor immunity, volunteer actor immunity, or mutual aid agreement statute 
immunity.144 All of these factors contribute to a general unwillingness of 
paid medical practitioners to respond to a disaster and provide care.145 Fear 
of this “immunity gap” may lead to a decrease in doctors who are willing 
to respond to hospital staffing requests during disasters.146 
Currently, the law offers excellent immunity protections to 
government actors, as well as to those medical practitioners who are 
considered government actors by means of employment, agency, or 
deputation.147 This expansion of “government actor” status may help to 
                                                     
 141. See Hoffman et al., Law, Liability, and Pub. Health, supra note 4, at 122. 
 142. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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address the immunity gap that private actor physicians fall into during 
disasters. Federally, and across all four PNEMA states, government actor 
medical practitioners receive immunity from civil liability as long as their 
actions are within the scope of their duties and not grossly negligent, 
wanton, or reckless.148 
Two states, Washington and Oregon, have statutory schemes in place 
that could offer volunteer medical practitioners immunity for their acts and 
omissions during the disaster. Both approaches require that the volunteers 
be preregistered with a government authority; however, Washington’s 
approach also includes a restriction mandating that the preregistered 
volunteers not receive compensation if they wish to receive immunity.149 
By including such restrictions, Washington and the other PNEMA 
member states, with the exception of Oregon, have stripped the frontline 
medical practitioners, particularly doctors and nurses staffing emergency 
rooms and trauma centers, of the ability to enjoy the same liability 
protections that are extended to federal or state government actors or Good 
Samaritan volunteers.150 
Those in favor of maintaining the legal status quo seek to ensure that 
society will continue to hold paid medical practitioners responsible for 
their actions by allowing injured patients to recover damages. 
Accountability is important because we equate being held accountable 
with providing a better quality of care. But, should paid medical 
practitioners not be held to the same standard as their volunteer 
counterparts when practicing in a disaster area? If the care provided by 
medical practitioners with immunity was notably below par and harming 
patients, why does such widespread support for volunteer medical 
provider immunity exist? Paid, governmental, and volunteer medical 
practitioners should be held to the same standards of care and liability. 
Granting immunity to paid medical practitioners during times of disaster 
will not destroy the quality of care they give to their patients, just as it has 
not destroyed the quality of care that volunteer or government actor 
medical practitioners give to their patients. Granting immunity to paid 
medical practitioners during disasters will perpetuate an idea of “same 
conditions, same care, and same standards.” 
Is it proper to extend the “benefit” of immunity to paid medical 
practitioners during disasters when responding to the sick and injured is 
what they are being paid to do? Being a medical practitioner in a disaster 
area is well beyond the scope of what is required of a medical practitioner 
in ordinary circumstances. The difference is so distinct that the State of 
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Oregon will not allow any registered volunteer medical practitioner to 
respond to a disaster without first receiving special training in the structure 
of the emergency response system, emergency response operations, 
emergency preparedness, disaster medicine, psychological first aid, 
disaster life support, and wilderness first aid or medicine.151 Such training 
is crucial to enable medical providers to respond to conditions beyond their 
control that may call for them to perform above and beyond the call of 
duty. 
In recent memory, the most well-known instance of medical 
practitioners caring for patients under dire circumstances are the events at 
Memorial Medical Center in New Orleans, Louisiana, during Hurricane 
Katrina in August of 2005.152 At the start of the hurricane, Memorial 
sheltered 2,000 people, of which 200 were patients and 600 were staff.153 
On the day the hurricane struck, the city’s power failed at 4:55 a.m.154 The 
next day the storm had passed, but extensive flooding forced the hospital 
to remain on backup generators. After almost 48 hours of continuous 
operation, the backup generators failed at 2:00 a.m., two days after the 
storm.155 The medical practitioners were then left in the dark to care for 
130 patients, 52 of whom were critical.156 The hospital’s windows, 
smashed in by the hurricane, let in the oppressively humid heat, bringing 
the temperature in the building to over 100 degrees Fahrenheit and 
allowing the flood waters of New Orleans, tainted with raw sewage and 
corpses, to permeate the building.157 After the storm began, help did not 
come for three days.158 In light of these events, it is clear that practicing 
medicine is fundamentally different during a disaster and the laws applied 
to medical practitioners during disasters should reflect that difference. 
It is unrealistic to expect the same standard of care under disaster 
conditions. We must not hinder paid medical practitioners with worries of 
liability. Instead, we must design the laws that apply to medical 
practitioners providing care under disaster conditions in a way that reflects 
the reality of the situations in which they operate. Thus, the laws governing 
medical practitioner immunity during disasters should be pragmatic and 
supportive to all medical practitioners, regardless of their paid, 
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governmental, or volunteer status and should not place additional burdens 
on them. 
III. EXPANDING EMERGENCY RESPONSE EFFECTIVENESS  
WITH EQUAL IMMUNITY 
To simplify emergency management procedures and provide a 
greater level of certainty and confidence to the medical community and 
lawyers regarding how liability will be assessed after a disaster, 
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Alaska should adopt the private liability 
scheme proposed in the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act 
(MSEHPA).159 
The Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown and Johns 
Hopkins Universities drafted the MSEHPA at the request of the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention.160 It is model legislation intended for 
consideration by the states as they draft their own legislative responses to 
disasters and emergencies that impact public health.161 The MSEHPA 
recognizes that “if . . . health professionals . . . are to fulfill their 
responsibilities for preventing and responding to a serious health threat, 
they should not fear unwarranted liability.”162 
The MSEHPA seeks to “provide[] responsible state actors with the 
powers they need to detect and contain a potentially catastrophic disease 
outbreak and, at the same time, protect[] individual rights and 
freedoms.”163 The MSEHPA accomplishes this goal in part by providing 
private liability immunity during a public health emergency to the 
following actors and stating: 
Any private person, firm, or corporation and employees and agents 
of such person, firm, or corporation, who renders assistance or advice 
at the request of the State or its political subdivisions under the 
provisions of this Act shall not be liable for causing the death of, or 
injury to, any person or damage to any property except in the event 
of gross negligence or willful misconduct.164 
                                                     
 159. CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB.’S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., THE 
MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (2001), http://www.aapsonline.org/legis/ 
msehpa2.pdf [https://perma.cc/E43L-2S9M]. 
 160. Lawrence O. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public Health and 
Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 4 (2003). 
 161. Id. at 5. 
 162. Id. at 19. 
 163. Id. at 5. 
 164. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT, supra note 159, at § 804(b)(3). 
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During a state of emergency, the states involved need to call upon all 
of their medical practitioners to help care for the ill or injured.165 The 
breadth of the private actor immunity should include even those medical 
practitioners who are being paid during the emergency because the 
conditions in which they are required to perform are no less dire than those 
in which volunteer medical practitioners find themselves. Reading the 
MSEHPA’s private liability exemption as including paid medical 
practitioners also helps to further its goal of providing the State with the 
powers it needs to address a health related emergency by ensuring that  
(1) no medical practitioners elect to leave in an attempt to avoid potential 
liability, thus ensuring the maximum numbers of medical practitioners are 
available to respond to the emergency; (2) medical practitioners will be 
less likely to engage in the practice of “defensive medicine”;166 and  
(3) medical resources will be used more efficiently in the absence of 
defensive medicine, which is of critical importance because supplies may 
become scarce during the emergency. 
However, limitations on liability should not preclude recovery. 
Rather than having injured patients seek damages against individual 
medical practitioners, it could be more efficient, and equitable, for injured 
patients to submit claims to a victims’ compensation fund created by the 
individual states. Such funds already exist under the PREP Act.167 The 
development of such a compensation fund will encourage medical 
practitioners to participate in emergency response efforts by addressing 
their apprehension about injury liability while attempting to practice in 
disaster zone conditions. Further, the legal system will also ensure that 
patients who are injured will be able to recover damages for their losses. 
CONCLUSION 
The implementation of the MSEHPA approach across all PNEMA 
states will serve many purposes, including simplifying a presently 
haphazard patchwork of immunity statutes and liability standards, 
incentivizing medical practitioner participation in emergency response to 
disaster, and promoting the more efficient use of both personnel and 
resources when responding to a disaster. However, the most important 
                                                     
 165. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-21: Public Health and Medical 
Preparedness, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Oct. 18, 2007), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-21.htm 
[https://perma.cc/DZ6N-DP3Z]. 
 166. Defensive medicine is the practice by a physician of ordering many tests or consultations 
as a means of self-protection against charges of malpractice in the event of an unfavorable outcome of 
treatment. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 522 (2d ed. 1987). 
 167. HEALTH RES. & SERVICES ADMIN., COUNTERMEASURES INJURY COMP. PROGRAM  
FACT SHEET, http://www.hrsa.gov/cicp/cicpfactsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML2X-KLZ5]. The 
Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program is the injury compensation fund for the PREP Act. 
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outcome of implementing the MSEHPA approach would be closing the 
liability gap and eliminating the home-field disadvantage many doctors 
experience. Under normal conditions, the burden of potential liability is an 
important part of maintaining a safe medical system by serving as a 
deterrent to negligent or reckless medical treatment. But in a time of crisis, 
the burden of potential liability is amplified by the chaos of mass-triage, 
having to practice medicine in potentially dangerous conditions, and the 
sudden unreliability of available, required medical facilities and supplies. 
During a crisis, the burden of liability is amplified to the point that it 
may prove to be harmful to patients by incentivizing a doctor to practice 
defensive medicine and utilize more than the minimum supplies required. 
Further, the burden may bias a doctor’s triage evaluation towards 
recommending a “judgment call” patient be listed as an expected fatality 
instead of providing care that may have an increased risk of complications 
or death, and therefore liability, because of the conditions posed by the 
crisis. By temporarily waiving the burden of liability during a crisis, we 
give doctors more options for allocating medical resources and 
determining the best course of treatment for their patient. By being flexible 
during a crisis and removing the usual restraints imposed by the burden of 
liability, we are furthering the ultimate goal of better protecting and 
preserving the health of disaster victims and the public at large. 
